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OF  HUMAN  DIGNITIES
Mark L. Movsesian*
INTRODUCTION
Dignitatis Humanae :  “Of Human Dignity.”  The Second Vatican Coun-
cil’s 1965 declaration on religious liberty must have seemed a triumph—an
exclamation mark signaling the success of a decades-long project, begun dur-
ing the Second World War, to restore human rights to the center of Catholic
social teaching.1  In wartime addresses, Pope Pius XII had called for recogni-
tion of human rights, based in human dignity, as the foundation for a stable
peace.2  In 1963, Pope John XXIII had made universal human rights, includ-
ing religious liberty, part of the Magisterium.3  The project had had effects
outside the Church as well.  In 1948, largely as a result of Catholic influence,
the United Nations had adopted a Universal Declaration of Human Rights
with human dignity at its core.4  That declaration contained a ringing
endorsement of religious liberty: “Everyone has the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his
© 2016 Mark L. Movsesian.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Frederick A. Whitney Professor and Director, Center for Law and Religion, St.
John’s University.  I thank Robert Delahunty, Marc DeGirolami, Lawrence Joseph, John
McGinnis, and Peggy McGuinness, as well as the participants in this symposium, for helpful
comments, and St. John’s Law student Christina Vlahos for research assistance.
1 Human rights have long roots in Catholic thought, going back at least to the six-
teenth-century neo-Scholastics.  But the Church had distanced itself from rights-talk in the
nineteenth century, alarmed by the excesses of the Enlightenment and the French Revolu-
tion. See John Witte, Jr., Introduction to CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 8, 22, 24 (John
Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010).
2 Drew Christiansen, S.J., Commentary on Pacem in Terris, in MODERN CATHOLIC
SOCIAL TEACHING 217, 236 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 2005); SAMUEL MOYN, CHRISTIAN
HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (2015).
3 See Christiansen, supra note 2, at 217, 233; Christopher McCrudden, In Pursuit of
Human Dignity: An Introduction to Current Debates, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 1,
16–17 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013).
4 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), art. 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
Although the drafters came from varied cultural backgrounds, see MARY ANN GLENDON, A
WORLD MADE NEW 225–26 (2001), Catholic ideas had a powerful influence, through think-
ers like Maritain, Malik, and others. Christiansen, supra note 2, at 235–36 (discussing influ-
ence of Catholic ideas).
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religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, prac-
tice, worship and observance.”5
How different things looks now.  True, numerous treaties protect
human rights; international organizations monitor their enforcement.6  Con-
ventional wisdom holds that human rights, including religious liberty, are
universal.7  Yet, as Allen Hertzke writes, “[d]espite considerable progress
since the passage of the Universal Declaration, only a minority of people on
earth enjoys the kind of religious freedom called for in international cove-
nants.”8  According to a recent Pew Survey, “some 70 percent of the world’s
6.8 billion people live in countries with high restrictions on religion.”9  One
cannot know, of course, what the situation would be like without them.  But
there is little evidence that either the Universal Declaration or Dignitatis
Humanae have done much to secure, as a practical matter, the universal
vision of religious freedom they contemplate.10
Notwithstanding a surface consensus, fifty years after Dignitatis Humanae,
nothing like universal agreement exists on what human dignity means and
what it entails for religious liberty.11  A variety of competing understandings
exist.  There are objective understandings that ground dignity in external
factors beyond individual choice.  The Catholic Church advocates one such
understanding; the Russian Orthodox Church and the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation advocate others.12  Objective understandings conflict
with a subjective conception of human dignity, based on the will of the indi-
vidual, which most secular human rights advocates prefer.  The rival concep-
tions of dignity clash, particularly in the context of “new rights” like same-sex
5 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), supra note 4, art. 18.
6 For a good overview, see T. Jeremy Gunn, The Human Rights System, in CHRISTIANITY
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 193.
7 See Christoph Grabenwarter, Freedom of Religion: The Contribution of Benedict XVI to a
Universal Guarantee from a European Perspective, in POPE BENEDICT XVI’S LEGAL THOUGHT
150, 153 (Marta Cartabia & Andrea Simoncini eds., 2015).
8 Allen D. Hertzke, Religious Freedom in the World Today: Paradox and Promise, in UNIVER-
SAL RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY 118 (Mary Ann Glendon & Hans F. Zacher eds.,
2012).
9 Id.
10 See ERIC A. POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 7 (2014) (“[T]here is
little evidence that human rights treaties, on the whole, have improved the well-being of
people, or even resulted in respect for the rights in those treaties.”).
11 See Thomas Banchoff & Robert Wuthnow, Introduction to RELIGION AND THE GLOBAL
POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (Thomas Banchoff & Robert Wuthnow eds., 2011) (noting
that notwithstanding the “near-global consensus that human rights are a good thing,” con-
troversy rages about “[w]hat rights mean and how to realize them”).
12 For a recent analysis of the human rights perspectives of these three religious voices,
see generally Peter Petkoff, Religious Exceptionalism, Religious Rights, and Public International
Law, in THE CHANGING NATURE OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 211 (Mal-
colm D. Evans et al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter CHANGING NATURE OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS].
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marriage.13  In that context, groups and countries that advocate objective
conceptions of dignity join forces to resist supporters of the subjective
understanding.
A conflict also exists between individualist and corporate understand-
ings.14  The former conceive dignity mostly in terms of individual persons.
Notwithstanding disagreement on the objective/subjective question, both
the Catholic and the secular understandings of human dignity are principally
individualist.  Corporate understandings, by contrast, emphasize group dig-
nity and rights.  On corporate understandings, religious communities—in
particular, traditional religious communities—can assert claims to religious
liberty against outsiders who threaten communal integrity.  Although impor-
tant differences exist between them, the Russian Orthodox Church and the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation both endorse understandings of relig-
ious liberty with strong corporate elements.  The conflict between individual-
ist and corporate understandings plays out particularly in controversies over
proselytism and the right to convert.  On these issues, the Catholic Church
and secular human rights advocates find themselves on the same side, argu-
ing together against voices from other traditions.
In short, the postwar project to forge a universal notion of human dig-
nity has failed.  Instead, radically different understandings contend against
one another and prevent agreement on crucial issues.  How are we lawyers to
respond?  One response is to work harder to achieve consensus.  At a confer-
ence on religious freedom the St. John’s Center for Law and Religion co-
sponsored in Rome in 2014, Pope Francis asked us all to recommit to the
universal conception of religious liberty contained in Dignitatis Humanae.
Recognizing “universally shared values,” Francis maintained, could promote
“mutual respect” among religions and “global cooperation in view of the
common good.”15  Serious scholars, particularly from the United States, have
advocated more robust promotion of a universal notion of human dignity,
and religious liberty, across the globe.16
13 See Marta Cartabia, The Challenges of “New Rights” and Militant Secularism, in UNIVER-
SAL RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY, supra note 8, at 428, 428–29.
14 Jose´ Casanova, Globalization and the Free Exercise of Religion Worldwide, in CHALLENGES
TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 139, 140–41 (Gerard V. Bradley ed.,
2012) [hereinafter CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY].
15 Pope Francis, Address of Pope Francis to Participants in the Conference on “Inter-
national Religious Freedom and the Global Clash of Values” (June 20, 2014), http://w2.
vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2014/june/documents/papa-francesco_
20140620_liberta-religiosa.html.  For the conference proceedings, see LA LIBERTA` RELIGI-
OSA SECONDO IL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E IL CONFLITTO GLOBALE DEI VALORI (Monica
Lugato ed., 2015).
16 See, e.g., THOMAS F. FARR, WORLD OF FAITH AND FREEDOM: WHY INTERNATIONAL RELIG-
IOUS LIBERTY IS VITAL TO AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY (2008); Daniel Philpott, A Foreign
Policy of Religious Freedom: Theoretical and Evidentiary Foundations, in CHALLENGES TO RELIG-
IOUS LIBERTY, supra note 14, at 175.
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With respect, these efforts seem to me misguided.  True, one can point
to examples that suggest a convergence of ideas about human dignity.17  But,
on the whole, the differences are too profound to be resolved easily.  The
chances that any one camp will persuade the others to adopt its views on
dignity and religious freedom seem to me slim.  Rather than trying to forge
agreement on universal concepts, we lawyers should commit to a more mod-
est approach, one that accepts the reality of disagreement and finds a
humane way to accommodate it.  Such an approach will seem defeatist to
universalizers.  But it has greater likelihood of success in the real world than
the more ambitious programs currently on offer.
I proceed as follows.  In Part I, I discuss the conflict between objective
and subjective conceptions of human dignity, particularly in the context of
same-sex marriage and “traditional values” resolutions at the UN Human
Rights Council.  In Part II, I discuss the conflict between individualist and
corporate conceptions, focusing on proselytism and the right to convert.  In
Part III, I conclude with some observations on the implications of the dis-
agreements I have identified.
Two notes before I begin.  First, the taxonomy I offer is only partial.
Other conceptions of human dignity exist, and my categories overlap some-
what.  Moreover, I treat the various approaches to human dignity in broad
terms.  The traditions I discuss have many nuances and multiple expressions.
Within each, dissenters quarrel with the mainstream positions I describe.
Nonetheless, I believe my categories offer useful heuristics for appreciating
the current situation.
Second, my goal in this Article is principally analytic rather than norma-
tive.  My main goal is to explain in some detail the different conceptions of
dignity and identify the implications for neuralgic controversies in contem-
porary human rights law.  Unpacking the various definitions of human dig-
nity and understanding their implications takes time.  But it is a necessary
step to understanding the crisis in human rights law today.
I. OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE APPROACHES
Louis Henkin famously referred to human dignity as the “ur-principle”
of contemporary human rights.18  Dignity is the “ultimate value,” the univer-
sally agreed foundation for the entire regime.19  The Universal Declaration’s
preamble affirms that “recognition of the inherent dignity . . . of all members
of the human family” is the basis for freedom, justice, and world peace.20
17 See, e.g., Andrea Pin, The Arab Road to Dignity: The Goal of the “Arab Spring”
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
18 LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 80 (1999).
19 See Mary Ann Glendon, International Law: Foundations of Human Rights—The Unfin-
ished Business, in RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN
LAW 317, 319 (Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., 2007) (discussing
Henkin and other scholars).
20 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), supra note 4, pmbl.  This language tracks the UN Charter. See
Glendon, supra note 19, at 319.
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Article 1 states that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights” and “are endowed with reason and conscience.”21  In the references
to “dignity,” “reason,” and “conscience,” one readily perceives the influence
of Catholic social thought, though the Universal Declaration had other
sources as well.
According to the Universal Declaration, a series of universal rights,
applicable to everyone, everywhere, follows from this core principle of
human dignity, including the right to religious liberty in Article 18, which I
quote above.  Over the ensuing decades, many other human rights instru-
ments, both international and domestic, have followed the Universal Declara-
tion in grounding human rights in human dignity, including the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Like the Universal Dec-
laration, the latter contains a right to religious liberty in its own Article 18.22
Neither the Universal Declaration nor any of these other instruments
actually defines “human dignity,” however.  Nor do they explain why certain
rights follow from human dignity, nor why their scope should be universal.
In the Universal Declaration itself, the omission was deliberate.23  Given the
diversity of viewpoints, agreement on first principles would have been very
difficult, perhaps impossible.24  In a lawyerly way, the drafters obtained
agreement on the text and “left the problem of foundations for another
day.”25  Later instruments followed the same pattern.  As a result, no consen-
sus definition of human dignity exists in international human rights law.  The
term has many meanings, some of them quite inconsistent.  As Christopher
McCrudden observes, “[h]uman dignity often seems to be used on both sides
of many of the most controversial political debates: on issues such as abor-
tion, assisted suicide, genetic experimentation, freedom of expression, and
gay rights, human dignity is invoked to justify apparently conflicting
positions.”26
A. Objective Understandings
Nonetheless, it is possible to group the different conceptions of human
dignity into four broad, overlapping categories, each with implications for
21 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), supra note 4, art. 1.
22 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 18, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Dec. 16, 1966); id. pmbl.; cf. GLENDON, supra note 4, at 175 (discussing the “large family of
dignity-based rights instruments that were adopted after the Second World War” and tying
them to the Universal Declaration).
23 See Paolo G. Carozza, Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Human Experience, in
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 615, 621.
24 See Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human
Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 678 (2008).  Jacques Maritain famously quipped that any
attempt to define “dignity” would have prevented agreement.  GLENDON, supra note 4, at
77–78.
25 Glendon, supra note 19, at 317.
26 McCrudden, supra note 3, at 1.
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religious liberty.  The first category is objective understandings.  Objective
understandings tie human dignity to external factors beyond the individual
person.  Dignity derives, not from a person’s subjective choice, which may be
disoriented or otherwise unworthy of respect, but from some “particular, pre-
existing norm or value” that sets the boundary of dignity and “delimits” the
rights that follow from it.27
In this Section, I address three such conceptions of human dignity, all of
them from religious traditions.  I begin with the mainstream Catholic con-
ception, manifested most clearly in Dignitatis Humanae, which ties dignity to
essential characteristics of human nature.28  I next discuss the Russian Ortho-
dox Church’s conception, which links dignity to enduring national and cul-
tural traditions.  Finally, I consider the version of dignity advocated by the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation, which ties dignity to practice of “[t]rue
faith”—Islam.29
1. The Catholic Church
Catholic thought ties dignity to human nature, which it sees as an objec-
tive, universal phenomenon.  Dignity, properly understood, consists in con-
forming to human nature; rights, properly understood, promote dignity by
allowing human beings to act in accordance with their nature.  Although, for
Catholics, the truths about human nature follow both from divine revelation
and from human reason, in explaining its position to the outside world, the
Church has tended to emphasize the latter.  For example, in a 2008 address
to the United Nations, Pope Benedict XVI made a strong, natural-law argu-
ment for an objective understanding of human rights and warned against a
more subjective approach. “Human rights,” he said,
are based on the natural law inscribed on human hearts and present in dif-
ferent cultures and civilizations.  Removing human rights from this context
would mean restricting their range and yielding to a relativistic conception,
according to which the meaning and interpretation of rights could vary and
their universality would be denied in the name of different cultural, politi-
cal, social and even religious outlooks.  This great variety of viewpoints must
not be allowed to obscure the fact that not only rights are universal, but so
too is the human person, the subject of those rights.30
Dignitatis Humanae, which makes a Catholic argument for religious lib-
erty as a civil right, offers a good illustration.  It begins by grounding religious
27 Christopher McCrudden, Benedict’s Legacy: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and the Pos-
sibility of Dialogue, in POPE BENEDICT XVI’S LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 7, at 165, 168.
28 For a discussion of alternative Catholic voices on human dignity, see McCrudden,
supra note 3, at 22–25.
29 ORG. OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, THE CAIRO DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAM
art. 1 (1990) [hereinafter CAIRO DECLARATION], http://www.oic-oci.org/english/article/
human.htm.
30 Pope Benedict XVI, Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the General Assembly
of the United Nations (Apr. 18, 2008), http://w2.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/
speeches/2008/april/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20080418_un-visit.html.
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liberty “in the very dignity of the human person as this dignity is known
through the revealed word of God and by reason itself.”31  Note the two,
independent justifications: divine revelation and human reason.  It is fair to
say, though, that Dignitatis Humanae emphasizes the latter, natural-law
approach.32  John Courtney Murray later explained that, as the only Vatican
II document “formally addressed to the whole world—Christian and non-
Christian, religious and atheist”—the Declaration appropriately led with an
argument from reason alone.33
Dignitatis Humanae maintains that reason reveals an essential truth about
human nature.  By nature, human beings are “impelled” to seek the truth
about ourselves and the world in which we live, “especially religious truth.”34
Human dignity thus requires that people have religious liberty.  People must
have the right, free from state interference, to do what their nature impels: to
inquire into religious truth; to determine the content of that truth; and to act
in conformity with that truth, in good conscience.
Note that Dignitatis Humanae does not ground dignity in the subjective
choice of the individual.35  It could not do so and maintain the Church’s
teaching that Catholicism is objectively true—and nothing in the document
alters that teaching.36  After all, given freedom, many people will choose
other religions, or atheism, for reasons they find subjectively compelling.
Many will fail to bother with the choice at all.  Instead, according to Dignitatis
Humanae, dignity inheres in objective facts about human nature itself, in the
essentially human curiosity about transcendent reality:37
[T]he right to religious freedom has its foundation not in the subjective
disposition of the person, but in his very nature.  In consequence, the
right . . . continues to exist even in those who do not live up to their obliga-
tion of seeking the truth and adhering to it and the exercise of this right is
not to be impeded, provided that just public order be observed.38
31 Paul VI, Declaration Dignitatis Humanae para. 2 (Dec. 7, 1965), http://www.vati-
can.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_
dignitatis-humanae_en.html.
32 See Thomas Pink, The Right to Religious Liberty and the Coercion of Belief: A Note on
Dignitatis Humanae, in REASON, MORALITY AND LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN FINNIS 427,
434–45 (John Keown & Robert P. George eds., 2013).
33 John Courtney Murray, S.J., Religious Freedom, in THE DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN II 672,
688 n.24 (Walter M. Abbott ed., 1966).
34 Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 31.
35 See David-Maria Jaeger, OFM, The Holy See’s Understanding of Religious Freedom, in
CHANGING NATURE OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 235, 242; see also Murray, supra
note 33, at 679 n.5.
36 See Jaeger, supra note 35, at 238.
37 See id. at 242; see also Hertzke, supra note 8, at 111 (“Human reason . . . propels an
innate quest by people everywhere to understand ultimate truths about their purpose,
meaning, and destiny.”).
38 Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 31.
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2. The Russian Orthodox Church
A 2008 statement by the Russian Orthodox Church, the Basic Teaching on
Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights, adopts a somewhat different objective
approach.39  The statement is the most systematic, official treatment of
human rights to date in the Orthodox tradition.40  It has drawn controversy,
both within Orthodoxy, which, like Catholicism, encompasses different view-
points on human rights, and in the wider world.41  Some critics decry the
statement’s conservatism.  Others dismiss it as a political document meant to
enhance the prestige of the Putin regime.42  Whatever the motivations of the
statement’s authors, though, the arguments deserve to be taken on their own
terms.
Like Dignitatis Humanae, the Basic Teaching grounds human dignity in
the fact of divine creation: God has created human beings in His image and
likeness.43  It contains no additional argument from natural reason, however.
Indeed, it asserts that divine creation “is the only ground which makes it
possible to assert that human nature has an inherent dignity.”44  Moreover, it
ties human dignity directly to moral behavior.45  “According to the Orthodox
tradition,” it explains, “a human being preserves his God-given dignity and
grows in it only if he lives in accordance with moral norms.”46  Human dig-
nity cannot be grounded in the subjective choice of the individual, since the
individual may choose to live in an immoral, sinful way.  Such a choice would
not “ruin the God-given dignity ontologically,” but would “darken[ ] it so
much as to make it hardly discernible.”47
In one of its most controversial aspects, the Basic Teaching goes on to
identify morality with nations’ cultural and religious traditions.48  Such tradi-
39 Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX
CHURCH, https://mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2016) [hereinafter Basic Teaching].
40 See Alfons Bru¨ning, “Freedom” vs. “Morality”—On Orthodox Anti-Westernism and Human
Rights, in ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 125, 129 (Alfons Bru¨ning & Evert
van der Zweerde eds., 2012) [hereinafter ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS].
41 Cf. Alfons Bru¨ning & Evert van der Zweerde, Introduction: Orthodox Christianity and
Human Rights—An Ambiguous Relationship, in ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 40, at 1, 14 (noting the “complex[ ]” and “controversial” relationship “between
the Orthodox Christian tradition and the ‘Western’ concept of Human Rights”).
42 See, e.g., Alexander Agadjanian, The Russian Orthodox Teaching on Human Rights—Its
Socio-Cultural Significance and Its Social Theory Perspective, in ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 40, at 271, 272 (recounting these criticisms).
43 See Basic Teaching, supra note 39, § I.1.
44 Id.
45 See ARISTOTLE PAPANIKOLAOU, THE MYSTICAL AS POLITICAL: DEMOCRACY AND NON-
RADICAL ORTHODOXY 93 (2012).
46 Basic Teaching, supra note 39, § I.5.
47 Id. § I.4.
48 There is some ambiguity in the Russian text, but the best reading comports with the
analysis here. See, e.g., KRISTINA STOECKL, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 72–74 (2014); Bru¨ning, supra note 40, at 132–33.
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tions, it argues, have objective moral authority.  They embody “generally
accepted and long established” values that are constitutive of enduring socie-
ties.49  Morality and dignity must be understood consistently with such tradi-
tions.  This has obvious implications for human rights, which the Basic
Teaching makes explicit.  “[T]he implementation of human rights,” it
declares, “should not come into conflict with God-established moral norms
and traditional morality based on them.”50  Human rights “should not . . .
justify any encroachment on . . . cultural values and the identity of a
nation.”51  Cultural and religious traditions, in other words, act as legitimate
limits on human rights.
I will have more to say about how traditions can operate to limit rights
below.  For now, two aspects of the Basic Teaching deserve emphasis.  First,
like Dignitatis Humanae, the Basic Teaching grounds human dignity in objec-
tive reality rather than subjective choice.  True, not everyone will be per-
suaded that traditional values reflect objective moral reality, just as not
everyone will be persuaded that human nature contains an innate quest for
transcendence.  But the Basic Teaching’s justification of human dignity is
objective, nonetheless.  Second, the Basic Teaching poses a challenge to the
concept of universal human rights.  Cultural and religious traditions differ
among nations; if traditions are the criteria for human rights, human rights
will not be the same everywhere.  The Basic Teaching seems to accept this.
Indeed, it contains an oblique criticism of the Western tendency to export its
own understanding of human rights across the globe: “Some civilizations
ought not to impose their own way of life on other civilizations under the
pretext of human rights protection.”52
3. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation
A third example appears in the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in
Islam, which the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) adopted in
1990.53  The OIC is an intergovernmental body comprising fifty-seven mem-
ber states with Muslim-majority populations; its website proclaims it to be
“the collective voice of the Muslim world.”54  Adopted by the OIC’s Council
of Foreign Ministers, the Cairo Declaration purports to offer member states
“general guidance” on human rights.55  It is comprehensive, and, notwith-
standing some disagreement about how well it reflects Islam or even state
49 Bru¨ning, supra note 40, at 133; see also id. at 137.
50 Basic Teaching, supra note 39, § III.5.
51 Id.  For more on this point, see PAPANIKOLAOU, supra note 45, at 94.
52 Basic Teaching, supra note 39, § III.4.
53 CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29.  Before 2011, the organization was known as the
Organization of the Islamic Conference. See ANN ELIZABETH MAYER, ISLAM AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: TRADITION AND POLITICS 2 (5th ed. 2013).
54 History, ORG. OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/page/
?p_id=52&p_ref=26&lan=en (last visited Feb. 19, 2016).
55 See CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29.
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practice, quite influential.56  The OIC, which typically coordinates the votes
of member states on human rights issues in international forums, treats the
declaration as “the central Islamic statement on human rights” and assidu-
ously promotes it at the UN.57  One must take the declaration seriously as “an
Islamic countermodel of human rights.”58
Like Dignitatis Humanae and the Basic Teaching, the Cairo Declaration
offers an objective justification for human dignity: the fact of divine creation.
As a result of common “descent from Adam,” it states, “[a]ll men are equal in
terms of basic human dignity . . . without any discrimination on the grounds
of race, color, language, sex, religious belief, political affiliation, social status
or other considerations.”59  But it goes beyond this statement to make an
argument for human dignity that differs greatly from the ones found in those
other documents.  Where the Catholic document speaks in terms of intrinsic
human nature, and the Russian Orthodox document in terms of religious
and cultural traditions, the OIC’s statement ties human dignity to the prac-
tice of Islam.
This conclusion follows from a fair reading of the text.60  The preamble
speaks of the need to affirm man’s “freedom and right to a dignified life in
accordance with the Islamic Shari’ah.”61  After grounding dignity in the fact
of divine creation, Article 1 continues with this somewhat cryptic statement:
“True faith is the guarantee for enhancing such dignity along the path to
human perfection.”62  The meaning is not entirely clear, but several other
provisions suggest strongly that the phrase “true faith” refers to Islam.  As
Ann Mayer writes, “the entire declaration has a pronounced Islamic bias.”63
The preamble refers to the Islamic Ummah as “the best nation,” a “universal
and well-balanced civilization in which . . . knowledge is combined with
faith.”64  Article 10 proclaims Islam to be “the religion of unspoiled
nature.”65  Article 24 provides that the entire declaration is “subject to the
Islamic Shari’ah.”66  And, for good measure, Article 25 warns that “[t]he
Islamic Shari’ah is the only source of reference” for explaining or clarifying
anything in the declaration.67
56 See KRISTINE KALANGES, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC LAW: TOWARD A
WORLD LEGAL TRADITION 151 (2012) (“Scholars are divided as to whether the Cairo Decla-
ration defines authentic Islamic teachings on religious liberty and other human rights.”);
MAYER, supra note 53, at 31 (noting inconsistency with state practice).
57 MAYER, supra note 53, at 31; see also id. at 12 (noting that OIC “has coordinated the
positions adopted by its member states, which now typically vote as a bloc”).
58 KALANGES, supra note 56, at 150.
59 CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29, art. 1.
60 MAYER, supra note 53, at 147.
61 CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29, pmbl.
62 Id. art. 1.
63 MAYER, supra note 53, at 147.
64 CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29, pmbl.
65 Id. art. 10.
66 Id. art. 24.
67 Id. art. 25.
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The implication is inescapable: even if everyone is born with equal dig-
nity, pious Muslims attain an enhanced dignity, superior to that of non-Mus-
lims and, in fact, dissident Muslims.68  This understanding has obvious
implications for human rights, especially religious liberty.  Indeed, the Cairo
Declaration omits a specific guarantee of religious liberty.69  In addition to
Article 1’s reference to religious non-discrimination, the Declaration does
contain a vague allusion to the right to “live in security” for one’s religion.70
But one must read these articles in light of Article 24, which makes all rights
subject to the Sharia.  In mainstream, classical interpretations, the Sharia
allows for many restrictions on the religious practice of non-Muslims that
would violate international norms.71  The Cairo Declaration suggests these
restrictions are nonetheless consistent with its own, alternative human rights
regime.
In recent years, the OIC has downplayed Islamic exceptionalism in order
to cooperate with Russian Orthodox, Catholic, and other conservative groups
on “traditional values” resolutions in international forums.72  I explore this
alliance below.  Before doing so, though, it is important to contrast all three
objective versions of human dignity with a rival, subjective conception that
grounds human dignity in the fact of individual choice.
B. A Subjective Approach: Secular Human Rights Theory
The subjective view of human dignity has drawn significant support
among secular, Western human rights advocates.73  Indeed, it is so familiar to
most of us in the West that it hardly requires exposition.  It begins with the
understanding that human beings are autonomous agents who can legiti-
mately construct their own identities.  On this view, as Alasdair MacIntyre
once observed, the self is “a set of perpetually open possibilities.”74  One’s
identity is not set, but “changeable,” a matter of individual volition.75  Dignity
inheres in the choice itself, in the construction of one’s identity as one thinks
best, free from external constraints.  It is meaningless to ask whether the
choice is the correct one, according to some objective criterion.  Dignity is
not a matter of conforming oneself to objective moral reality, whether essen-
tial human nature, perduring communal traditions, or the true faith.  It is
68 MAYER, supra note 53, at 147.
69 KALANGES, supra note 56, at 150; see MAYER, supra note 53, at 185.
70 CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29, art. 18; see MAYER, supra note 53, at 147.
71 See KALANGES, supra note 56, at 155.
72 Petkoff, supra note 12, at 218–19.
73 See McCrudden, supra note 27, at 177; see also Matthias Mahlmann, The Good Sense of
Dignity: Six Antidotes to Dignity Fatigue in Ethics and Law, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY,
supra note 3, at 593, 600 (noting the importance of “autonomous subjectivity” in “interna-
tional case law and legal doctrine”).
74 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 32 (3d ed. 2007).
75 McCrudden, supra note 27, at 177.
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acting in a way that realizes one’s authentic self—“a subjective assent to one’s
true end.”76
This conception of dignity has obvious implications for human rights.
Rights exist to protect the individual as he attempts to construct his iden-
tity—to liberate him, in Marta Cartabia’s words, “from all forms of paternal-
ism and alienation,” that is, all attempts by public and even private
authorities to coerce him in ways that would violate his authentic self.77  As
long as he does not harm someone else—and harm is typically defined, nar-
rowly, to mean something like physical injury—he must be allowed to realize
his potential as he understands it.  In the words of the joint opinion in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, he has “the right to define [his] own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”78
The subjective understanding has clear implications for religious liberty.
As Julian Rivers writes, on the subjective understanding, religion can have
value only as a personal belief, a “projection[ ]” of the individual.79  It cannot
claim an objective authority that legitimately restricts the individual in the
construction of his authentic self.  But that is precisely what most religions do
claim.  Consequently, the subjective understanding “has always carried within
itself the seeds of a fundamental antagonism to religion,” a wariness about
religion’s capacity to repress self-actualization.80  This antagonism appears
with increasing frequency nowadays, for example, in controversies surround-
ing LGBT rights generally and same-sex marriage in particular.
C. Same-Sex Marriage and Traditional Values Resolutions
Although it doesn’t involve religious liberty per se, the controversy over
same-sex marriage offers a good illustration of the conflict between objective
and subjective views of dignity.  Same-sex marriage is not, at the moment, a
generally recognized international human right.81  Some scholars maintain
that it should be, however, and, on a subjective understanding, the argument
is quite strong.82  If dignity is a matter of constructing one’s own identity, and
categories like “male” and “female” are illegitimate external constraints, why
76 Joel Harrison, ‘A Communion in Good Living’: Human Dignity and Religious Liberty
Beyond the Overlapping Consensus, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 451,
455.
77 Cartabia, supra note 13, at 428, 435.
78 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
79 Julian Rivers, Justifying Freedom of Religion: Does ‘Dignity’ Help?, in UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 3, at 419.
80 Id.; see also Louis Henkin, Religion, Religions, and Human Rights, 26 J. RELIGIOUS ETH-
ICS 229, 235 (1998) (“From the human rights perspective, religions have often achieved
order at the cost of repression” and “limitations on individual liberty and on individual
development.”).
81 Lynn D. Wardle, Equality Principles as Asserted Justifications for Mandating the Legaliza-
tion of Same-Sex Marriage in American and Intercountry-Comparative Constitutional Law, 27 BYU
J. PUB. L. 489, 513 (2013).
82 See id. (noting that advocates have long argued that international human rights trea-
ties should be interpreted to include a right to same-sex marriage).
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would a right to same-sex marriage not exist?  On a subjective understanding,
restricting marriage to opposite-sex relationships seems repressive of per-
sons’ authentic selves—their freedom and dignity.  The recent American
Supreme Court decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, relies on this reasoning to
declare same-sex marriage a constitutional right in the United States.83
Because of their commitment to a subjective view of dignity, most secu-
lar human rights advocates find opposition to same-sex marriage incompre-
hensible, dismissing it, if they are being polite, as a sectarian preoccupation.
On an objective understanding of dignity, however, a right to same-sex mar-
riage is deeply problematic.  Consider the mainstream Catholic position,
which holds that human dignity consists in conforming to essential human
nature.  In mainstream Catholic thought, sexual difference and complemen-
tarity are fundamental aspects of human nature.84  In Pope Francis’s recent
words at the UN, there is “a moral law written into human nature itself, one
which includes the natural difference between man and woman.”85  This dif-
ference acts as a legitimate constraint on human conduct.  As a consequence,
same-sex marriage, which denies sexual difference and complementarity, is
inconsistent with human dignity, and no human right to same-sex marriage
exists.86  Note this is not, from the Catholic perspective, a religious argument
that depends on divine revelation.  It is a natural-law argument accessible to
all people, everywhere, at all times, on the basis of human reason.
Similarly, the Russian Orthodox position, which ties dignity to long-
standing moral tradition, cannot accommodate a right to same-sex marriage,
nor can the OIC’s position, which links dignity with the practice of Islam.87
Indeed, in recent years, the Russian Orthodox Church and the Organization
of Islamic Cooperation have formed a strategic alliance, along with some
Catholic and conservative NGOs, to promote a “traditional values” agenda at
the UN Human Rights Council.  Putting aside theological differences, these
83 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (noting that liberty, under the
Constitution, “extend[s] to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs”).
84 See, e.g., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2333 (2d ed. 2000) (“Everyone,
man and woman, should acknowledge and accept his sexual identity.  Physical, moral, and
spiritual difference and complementarity are oriented toward the goods of marriage and
the flourishing of family life.”).
85 Pope Francis, Meeting with the Members of the General Assembly of the United
Nations Organization, Address of the Holy Father (Sept. 25, 2015), http://w2.vatican.va/
content/francesco/en/speeches/2015/september/documents/papa-francesco_20150925
_onu-visita.html.
86 See, e.g., U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, BETWEEN MAN AND WOMAN: QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS ABOUT MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS, http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-
action/marriage-and-family/marriage/promotion-and-defense-of-marriage/questions-and-
answers-about-marriage-and-same-sex-unions.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 2016).
87 For a helpful discussion of various conceptions of tradition in the context of human
rights, see Christopher J. McCrudden, Human Rights, Southern Voices, and ‘Traditional Values’
at the United Nations (U. of Mich. Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research, Paper No. 419,
2014) [hereinafter McCrudden, Human Rights, Southern Voices], http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474241.
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groups have cooperated to make traditional values a central element in inter-
national human rights discourse.88  Opponents, including many Western
governments and progressive NGOs, see the traditional values campaign as
an attempt to counter the increasing prominence of LGBT rights, including
same-sex marriage.  The conflict over traditional values resolutions thus
offers a window into the deeper conflict between subjective and objective
approaches to human dignity.
The conflict began in 2008, with an address at the Human Rights Coun-
cil by Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church.89  Among other
things, Kirill criticized human rights law for ignoring nations’ cultural and
moral traditions.90  The following year, the Russian representative intro-
duced a resolution, supported by OIC members, on promoting human rights
“through a better understanding of traditional values of humankind.”91  The
Council approved the resolution and convened a conference on traditional
values the following year, in which several representatives of the Russian
Orthodox Church participated as members of the Russian delegation.92  In
2011, the Council requested a report from its Advisory Committee “‘on how
a better understanding and appreciation of traditional values’ could contrib-
ute to the promotion and protection of human rights.”93
The Advisory Committee’s report the following year revealed deep disa-
greement on the place of traditional values in human rights discourse.94
Although it did not directly address same-sex marriage or LGBT rights, it
warned that traditional values could be used in a way to subjugate minorities
and marginalized groups, including persons who challenge “the social con-
structions of gender on the basis of values said to be traditional, cultural or
religious.”95  The debate did not end there.  In October 2012, the Council
88 See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 53, at 206 (noting that this alliance “has given OIC mem-
bers expanded influence in the UN human rights system but has also necessitated adjust-
ing their tactics”).
89 Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, Chairman of the Moscow Patri-
archate, Address on the Panel Discussion on Human Rights and Intercultural Dialogue at
the Seventh Session of UN Human Rights Council (Mar. 18, 2008), http://www.interfax-
religion.com/?act=documents&div=121.
90 Id.
91 Human Rights Council Res. 12/21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/12/21 (Oct. 12, 2009).
92 STOECKL, supra note 48, at 110.  On the centrality of the Russian Church in promot-
ing the traditional values initiative, see id. at 113, and Christopher McCrudden, Faith-Based
Non-Governmental Organizations in the Public Square, in CHANGING NATURE OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 185, 188.
93 McCrudden, Human Rights, Southern Voices, supra note 87, at 23.
94 Rep. of the U.N. Human Rights Council Advisory Comm., Study of the Human Rights
Council Advisory Committee on Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Through a
Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/71 (Dec. 6,
2012) [hereinafter Advisory Comm. Report].  McCrudden provides fascinating back-
ground on the drafting of the report and the divergent views expressed.  McCrudden,
Human Rights, Southern Voices, supra note 87, at 23–26.
95 Advisory Comm. Report, supra note 94, § 42; see also STOECKL, supra note 48, at 112
(noting that Advisory Committee Report did not directly address LGBT rights).
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had passed yet another resolution noting that “traditional values” could be
applied to promote human dignity and human rights, and requesting that
the High Commissioner solicit the views of nations and NGOs on “best prac-
tices in the application of traditional values” while upholding human dignity
and rights.96
The High Commissioner reported back in June 2013.97  Like the Advi-
sory Committee report the year before, the High Commissioner’s summary
revealed substantial disagreement about the benefits of traditional values.
Western governments and progressive NGOs voiced skepticism.  The Euro-
pean Union, for example, noted that traditional values could pose a danger
to human rights, especially with regard to “violence against women, sexual
orientation, gender identity, age and disability.”98  Amnesty International
warned that governmental authorities might “misuse their power to define
the community’s traditional values in order to maintain the status quo.”99  By
contrast, religious and conservative NGOs voiced support for traditional val-
ues.  The Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute, for example, inter-
vened to highlight the “key role of the family, composed of a mother and a
father,” in promoting the “core values” of the “human rights project.”100
The fight over traditional values resolutions, which ended in a draw, was
a complex one.  The crucial point is this.  The resolutions represented an
attempt by actors with an objective understanding of dignity to define human
rights in a way that fit their understanding.  The opposition reflected a com-
peting, subjective understanding, which sees human rights as a way to tran-
scend tradition and promote human fulfillment.  The conflict continues.  In
the summer of 2015, the HRC adopted a new resolution, supported by Russia
and OIC members, reaffirming “that the family is the natural and fundamen-
tal group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the
State.”101  Western nations, including the United States and eleven European
countries, had strenuously opposed the resolution “on grounds that it put
too much emphasis on traditional family structures.”102
96 Human Rights Council Res. 21/3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/21/3 (Oct. 9, 2012).
97 U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Summary of Information from States Members of
the United Nations and Other Relevant Stakeholders on Best Practices in the Application of Tradi-
tional Values While Promoting and Protecting Human Rights and Upholding Human Dignity, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/24/22 (June 17, 2013).
98 Id. § 3.
99 Id. § 42.
100 Id. § 47.
101 Human Rights Council Res. 29/22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/29/22, at 2 (July 22,
2015).
102 Erasmus, The UN and Family Values: A New Global Force Is Fighting Liberal Social Mores,
ECONOMIST (July 11, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/erasmus/2015/07/un-and-
family-values.
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II. INDIVIDUALIST AND CORPORATE APPROACHES
The conflict between objective and subjective conceptions of dignity is
not the only one.  A conflict also exists between individualist approaches,
which conceive dignity and rights mostly in terms of individual persons, and
corporate approaches, which stress the dignity and rights of religious com-
munities, especially traditional religious communities with ties to national
histories and cultures.103  The differences are matters of degree.  Individual-
ist approaches make room for communal claims, and corporate approaches
do not completely deny the value of personal choice.  But, as Jose´ Casanova
writes, the individualist and corporate understandings exist in “fundamental
tension in the modern world.”104  The differences between them have seri-
ous practical consequences, particularly with respect to issues like proselytism
and the right to convert.
A. Individualist Approaches
Most Western readers will be familiar with individualist views of human
dignity.105  In this Section, I discuss two such approaches, the Catholic and
the secularist approach.  Important differences exist between them, particu-
larly on the legitimate demands of religious communities.  But both
approaches emphasize the claims of the individual.  The individual, not the
religious community, is the primary subject of dignity and rights.
1. The Catholic Church
Consider first the mainstream Catholic position, expressed in Dignitatis
Humanae. Dignitatis Humanae is shot through with references to individual
human dignity.106  Indeed, the first sentence, from which the Declaration
draws its name, refers to “the dignity of the human person.”107  Repeatedly,
the Declaration speaks in terms of individual rights and conscience.  A few
examples will suffice: “This Vatican Council declares that the human person
has a right to religious freedom.”108  “[E]very man has the duty, and there-
fore the right, to seek the truth in matters religious in order that he may with
prudence form for himself right and true judgments of conscience . . . .”109
“[A] man is bound to follow his conscience in order that he may come to
103 See, e.g., Casanova, supra note 14, at 140–41.
104 Id. at 140.
105 Cf. id. at 141–42 (noting that the individualist view is “the taken-for-granted cultural
understanding of religious liberty by most people, religious as well as secular, in most West-
ern societies”).
106 Cf. id. at 146 (noting that Dignitatis Humanae “recognized the inalienable right of
every individual to freedom of conscience based on the sacred dignity of the human per-
son” (emphasis omitted)).
107 Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 31, para. 1 (emphasis added).
108 Id. para. 2.
109 Id. para. 3.
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God . . . .”110  It is only “by a personal assent” that man may adhere to the
truth.111  The import of these statements is clear. Dignitatis Humanae’s argu-
ment for human dignity rests fundamentally on “the inviolability of the per-
son’s specifically human interiority.”112
To be sure, Dignitatis Humanae makes clear that human dignity and
religious freedom have important corporate dimensions as well.113  Because
humans are by nature social beings, it teaches, human dignity requires they
be allowed to act together in religious communities.  Such communities have
the right, among other things, to “govern themselves according to their own
norms”; to select their own ministers; to form institutions to further their
common life and worship; and to worship in public and teach their faith.114
The only permissible restrictions are those government may legitimately
impose in order to promote the “common welfare”—the rights of other citi-
zens, the preservation of public peace, and the “guardianship of public
morality.”115  Such restrictions must themselves conform to “the objective
moral order.”116
This corporate aspect of religious liberty has been central to Catholic
thought since at least the Papal Revolution of the eleventh century, and it
remains so today.117  Indeed, as I shall explain, the issue of collective relig-
ious freedom divides the Catholic and secularist understandings.  But its cor-
porate elements should not obscure the fact that Catholic thought conceives
religious freedom primarily as a right attaching to the individual human per-
son.  Under Dignitatis Humanae, for example, the corporate dimension of
religious liberty cannot justify state restrictions on the freedom of persons
outside the church—restrictions on the right to practice another religion, for
example.  Indeed, conservative Catholics like Patrick Brennan criticize
Dignitatis Humanae for muting some of the Church’s traditional jurisdictional
claims in order to promote individual liberty instead.118
Moreover, under Dignitatis Humanae, all religious communities have an
equal right to religious freedom.  Government may not act “in an unfair
spirit of partisanship.”119  Even where historical circumstances give a particu-
lar community a special role in society, the state cannot create obstacles for
the effective exercise of religion by other communities.120  As we shall see,
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Jaeger, supra note 35, at 242 (emphasis added).
113 See Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) an Exposition, Transla-
tion, and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33, 51 (2013) (discussing this aspect of
Dignitatis Humanae).
114 Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 31, para. 4.
115 Id. para. 7.
116 Id.
117 See, e.g., HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION (1983); Garnett, supra note 113.
118 Patrick McKinley Brennan, The Liberty of the Church: Source, Scope, and Scandal, 21 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 192 (2013).
119 Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 31, para. 7.
120 Id. para. 6.
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the approach of both the Russian Orthodox Church and the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation differs from the Catholic position on this point—a dif-
ference that becomes apparent in controversies surrounding proselytism and
the right to convert.
2. The Secularist Understanding
The secularist conception of human dignity is more radically individual-
ist than its Catholic counterpart.  As I explained in Part I, in the secularist
understanding, dignity inheres in the subjective act of choice, not the objec-
tive value of the option chosen.  Dignity is a matter of allowing the individual
to construct his own idea of meaning and live accordingly, without the hin-
drance of external constraints.
This subjectivism leads to a radically individualist conception of rights,
including religious freedom.  If what matters is subjective choice, then relig-
ion can have significance only because an individual has chosen it.121  Put
differently, religious exercise can merit protection only because of its impor-
tance to the individual believer—to his pursuit of meaning and the construc-
tion of his identity.  In principle, therefore, only individuals have the right to
religious freedom.122  The secularist position acknowledges a corporate
dimension of religion—the fact that people often join together to worship in
religious communities.  But these communities have importance, and merit
protection, only as voluntary associations of individual believers, not as enti-
ties in themselves.123  Their rights are entirely “derivative.”124  Indeed, in
some circumstances, the state must intervene in order to protect the individ-
ual believer from communal assertions of authority, which may stymie his
self-expression and spiritual authenticity.125
The disagreement concerning the rightful claims of religious communi-
ties distinguishes the Catholic and the secularist understandings.  As an illus-
tration, consider the recent controversy over the so-called ministerial
exception.  Under this exception, which a unanimous Supreme Court
endorsed in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, anti-discrimination laws do not apply to a
religious body’s employment of its ministers.126  The exception has a consti-
tutional basis, the Court explained, and, although the Court did not use the
phrase “church autonomy,” it rests ultimately on the corporate right of a
121 See Banchoff & Wuthnow, supra note 11, at 4.
122 See, e.g., Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism,
99 VA. L. REV. 917, 920–21 (2013).
123 See, e.g., Banchoff & Wuthnow, supra note 11, at 4 (noting the view of religious
organizations as “free associations of individuals”).
124 Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 122, at 921.
125 Cf. Cartabia, supra note 13, at 435 (discussing the function of “new rights” in pro-
tecting “the individual from all forms of coercion on the part of public and private
powers”).
126 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
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religious community to govern itself.127  The community’s right to choose its
ministers is essential to its own exercise of religion—to the community’s
“right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.”128
On the Catholic understanding, Hosanna-Tabor is not controversial.129
Indeed, much of the Court’s language echoes Dignitatis Humanae’s argument
about the right of a religious community to govern itself.  On a secularist
understanding, however, the decision is deeply problematic. Hosanna-Tabor’s
endorsement of the corporate right of the religious community comes at the
expense of individual believers within the church—the only persons who pos-
sess a right to exercise religion in the first place.130  The Court’s holding
allows religious communities to assert their authority against individual
believers in an arbitrary and discriminatory way, thus making a mockery of
human dignity, properly understood.  In Leslie Griffin’s phrase, the Court’s
holding shows it has “lost sight of individual religious freedom.”131
The disagreement with respect to corporate religious exercise is an
important one, but it should not distract us from the underlying commit-
ment, in both Catholic and secularist thought, to the individual.  Neither
Catholic nor secularist thought would allow a religious community to limit
the right of the individual to exit.  Neither would allow such a community to
seek the state’s help in restraining the religious expression of the individual
outside the community—attempts to proselytize, for example.  And neither
would argue that a religious community may legitimately seek protection, vis-
a`-vis the individual, on the ground that the community embodies traditional
cultural authority.  Strong corporate claims such as these do appear in other
versions of human dignity and rights, however.
B. Corporate Approaches
Corporate approaches are less familiar to Western readers.  These
approaches do not ignore individual rights, but, on important issues, they
give priority to the dignity and rights of religious communities.  Some
approaches emphasize the “natal” quality of the religious community in ques-
tion—the fact that people are born into it.132  Others stress the community’s
127 The concurring justices in Hosanna-Tabor did use the phrase “religious autonomy.”
See id. at 710 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Religion Clauses guarantee religious orga-
nizations autonomy in matters of internal governance . . . .”); id. at 711 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
128 Id. at 706.
129 See, e.g., Our First, Most Cherished Liberty, U.S. CONF. OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, http://
www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/our-first-most-cherished-liberty.cfm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2016) (quoting Hosanna-Tabor with approval).
130 For an argument that Hosanna-Tabor is consistent with an individualist view of relig-
ious freedom, see Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 122, at 975–76.
131 Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 982 (2013).
132 See Casanova, supra note 14, at 142.  Casanova gives Judaism and Hinduism as exam-
ples of this sort of justification. Id.
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traditional role in national culture and identity.133  Still others emphasize the
essential truth of the community’s spiritual claims.134  But all corporate
approaches share the conviction that the state may legitimately act to protect
religious communities from threats to their integrity.
In this Section, I address two corporate approaches, those of the Russian
Orthodox Church and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.  Serious dif-
ferences exist between them.  For example, Islam’s prohibition on conver-
sion and its conception of religion as, at least in part, a matter of descent,
have no equivalents in Orthodox thought.  Yet both approaches have strong
corporate elements that appear neither in the Catholic nor secularist
understandings.
1. The Russian Orthodox Church
In some respects, the Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching tracks
the language of Dignitatis Humanae.  Like Dignitatis Humanae, it acknowl-
edges that “the dignity and ultimate worth of every human person are
derived from the image of God.”135  Similarly, it affirms the importance of
individual freedom of conscience.  Every human person has the right to
choose “particular philosophical guidelines for his life.”136  Freedom of con-
science “protects the individual against any arbitrary treatment of his inner
world, against any forcible imposition of particular convictions upon him.”137
For this reason, the state must treat citizens equally, “regardless of their atti-
tude to religion.”138
Like Dignitatis Humanae, too, the Basic Teaching maintains that freedom
of conscience has a corporate dimension.  Religious organizations, as well as
individuals, enjoy its protection.  “[T]he freedom of conscience, proclaimed
and confirmed by law,” it proclaims, allows the “Church to preserve her iden-
tity and independence from people of other convictions and gives her a legal
ground both for the immunity of her internal life and public witness to the
Truth.”139  This freedom extends to all religious communities—provided
they have roots in a country’s history and tradition, an important limitation,
as I shall explain.  Finally, like Dignitatis Humanae, the Basic Teaching recog-
nizes that a nation’s culture may give certain religions a dominant role in
public life, and that civil law may appropriately reflect that fact.140
133 See Silvio Ferrari, Proselytism and Human Rights, in CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 253, 257 (discussing Orthodox Christianity).
134 See Casanova, supra note 14, at 142.
135 Basic Teaching, supra note 39, § I.2.
136 Id. § IV.3.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL409.txt unknown Seq: 21 11-MAY-16 8:22
2016] of  human  dignities 1537
Nonetheless, the Basic Teaching shows a fundamental ambivalence about
individual freedom of conscience that Dignitatis Humanae does not.141  In a
somewhat cryptic statement, the Basic Teaching suggests that legal protection
for freedom of conscience, although necessary, represents a kind of social
failure: “[T]he freedom of conscience asserted as a legal principle points to
the fact that society has lost religious goals and values.”142  The document
does not elaborate, but Alexander Agadjanian offers a plausible explanation:
the fact that individuals assert a legal right to freedom of conscience reflects
the fact that civil society has failed to live out the truth of Orthodox Christi-
anity and that some individuals therefore wander from the correct faith.143
Civil society must allow those individuals to do so, but their choice reflects a
sad societal breakdown.
Of course, Dignitatis Humanae also posits the existence of objective relig-
ious truth.  But the Vatican II document contains no such language sug-
gesting that legal protection for freedom of conscience reflects a social
failing.  Where Dignitatis Humanae celebrates the free exchange of religious
ideas, even erroneous ideas, the Basic Teaching sometimes seems to “resent[ ]
the pluralism of worldviews that is normal in modern societies.”144  Moreo-
ver, the Basic Teaching privileges the corporate claims of religious communi-
ties in a way that goes well beyond Dignitatis Humanae.  According to the Basic
Teaching, in some circumstances, the claims of a religious community out-
weigh the rights of individuals—not only with respect to internal church gov-
ernance, but more broadly.
For example, the Basic Teaching contains a paragraph, titled “Collective
Rights,” which opposes the rights of communities—including, importantly,
religious communities—to those of individuals.145  “The rights of an individ-
ual should not be destructive for the unique way of life and traditions . . . for
various religious, national and social communities,” it states.146  Other
passages provide more detail.  For example, the document indicates that
freedom of conscience cannot be employed in a manner that allows an indi-
vidual to “damage” another person’s “spiritual and cultural identity.”147  In
fact, the Basic Teaching holds that the “preservation of religious and cultural
traditions” is itself a human right.148  Indeed, according to Agadjanian, the
document’s final section suggests that, as between individual and corporate
rights, the latter receive priority.149
141 On the ambivalence toward freedom of conscience in the Basic Teaching, see STOE-
CKL, supra note 48, at 79.
142 Basic Teaching, supra note 39, § IV.3 (emphasis omitted) (quoting RUSSIAN ORTHO-
DOX CHURCH, DEP’T FOR EXTERNAL CHURCH RELATIONS, The Basis of the Social Concept, III.6,
https://mospat.ru/en/documents/social-concepts/iii/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016)).
143 See Agadjanian, supra note 42, at 279.
144 STOECKL, supra note 48, at 79.
145 Basic Teaching, supra note 39, § IV.9.
146 Id.
147 Id. § IV.3.
148 Id. § V.2.
149 See Agadjanian, supra note 42, at 281.
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The Basic Teaching’s ambivalence about individual rights and its empha-
sis on the religious community reflect central themes in Orthodox thought,
which distrusts Western-style individualism.150  It is not simply a matter of
rejecting the “excesses of individualism” in the matter of Western communi-
tarian scholars.151  Orthodoxy often expresses discomfort with the very idea
of the autonomous individual as a rights-holder.152  Orthodox thought
emphasizes the relational self: a person is defined by relationship to others in
the body of the Church.  As Daniel Payne writes, “the Orthodox tradition
understands the human being ecclesially rather than individualistically.”153
As a consequence, the tradition has a problem with the idea of individual
rights in the Western manner.154  “[I]f there is any concept of rights in
Orthodox political culture,” Payne explains, it is not individual rights, but
“group rights.”155
Moreover, Orthodox thought conflates religious and national identities
in a stronger way than in the West.  To be sure, religion can serve as a marker
of national and cultural identity in the West as well; consider Italy and
Poland.  And citizenship in Orthodox countries is not directly tied to relig-
ion; as a formal matter, one can be a Russian citizen and not an Orthodox
Christian.  But religion and nationality are intertwined in a particularly pow-
erful way in the Orthodox world.  In Russia, for example, it is a “widely
accepted idea”—“shared by politicians, intellectuals and clergy”—that Ortho-
doxy is the fundamental factor in national identity.156  Other historical and
ethnic factors pale in comparison.  The same may be said for other Orthodox
countries, like Greece.157
As a consequence, challenges to the Orthodox Church, especially by per-
sons claiming individual human rights, are apt to be seen as threats to
national and cultural identity, as well as to religious integrity.  This dynamic
appears especially in connection with disputes about proselytism by Western
groups.  Before turning to those controversies, however, it is useful to con-
150 E.g., Bru¨ning & van der Zweerde, supra note 41, at 10.  For an alternative view, see
PAPANIKOLAOU, supra note 45, at 6.
151 Agadjanian, supra note 42, at 287.
152 Id. at 287–88.
153 Daniel P. Payne, The Clash of Civilisations: The Church of Greece, the European Union and
the Question of Human Rights, 31 RELIGION ST. & SOC’Y 261, 263 (2003) (citing JOHN D.
ZIZIOULAS, BEING AS COMMUNION 49–66 (1993)).
154 Among the Orthodox theologians most cited for this proposition are Christos Yan-
naras and Vigen Guroian. See generally, e.g., Vigen Guroian, Human Rights and Modern West-
ern Faith: An Orthodox Christian Assessment, 26 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 241 (1998); Christos
Yannaras, Presentation at Holy Cross Greek Orthodox School of Theology: Human Rights
and the Orthodox Church (Oct. 4, 2002), http://www.goarch.org/special/pluralis-
tic2002/presentations/yannaras.  For a critique of these theologians, see John A. McGuc-
kin, The Issue of Human Rights in Byzantium and the Orthodox Christian Tradition, in
CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 173, 187.
155 Payne, supra note 153, at 263.
156 Bru¨ning, supra note 40, at 144.
157 See Payne, supra note 153, at 265.
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sider another corporate approach to dignity and rights—that of the Organi-
zation of Islamic Cooperation.
2. The Organization of Islamic Cooperation
Mainstream Islam places even more emphasis on the dignity of the relig-
ious community.  This is not to say that Islam ignores the individual believer.
On the contrary, individual personal responsibility is central to Islam.158
“The first and most important element of Muslim identity,” Tariq Ramadan
writes, is personal faith.159  The Shahada, recitation of which is sufficient to
make one a Muslim, is expressed in the singular (“I testify that there is no
god but Allah, and I testify that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.”).160
And Islamic human rights instruments recognize the claims of the individual.
The Cairo Declaration, for example, grants individual persons the right to
property, privacy, security, and freedom from unlawful arrest, among other
things, as well as the right to equality under the law.161
Yet Islam gives priority to corporate religious identity to a greater degree
than either contemporary Catholicism or Orthodox Christianity.  This is
because Islam, at least in part, is what Jose´ Casanova calls a “natal” relig-
ion.162  In addition to personal choice, one may become a Muslim simply by
birth.163  In classical Islamic law, the child “of a Muslim father is Muslim irre-
spective of any expression of will.”164  By contrast, a child of Christian parents
is not a Christian until baptism.165  (The practice of infant baptism, in which
parents stand in to express a decision in the child’s behalf, elides the distinc-
tion somewhat, but no Christian tradition teaches a person is a Christian sim-
ply by virtue of his ancestry).  Indeed, in some interpretations, the concept of
Islam by descent goes back beyond one’s “parents” to one’s “grandparents, or
even more distant ancestors.”166  People born Baha’is may be considered
apostates from Islam, for example, because their ancestors left the religion
generations ago.167
It follows that Islam, like other natal religions, has a particularly power-
ful corporate dimension.  In Islam, one may draw one’s religious identity, not
from any personal decision, but from the faith community into which one is
born—the Islamic Ummah.  Put another way, one’s religious identity may not
158 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im, The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate
Coexistence of Islamic Law and State Law, 73 MODERN L. REV. 1, 3 & n.3 (2010).
159 TARIQ RAMADAN, WESTERN MUSLIMS AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM 79 (2004).
160 MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 60 (3d ed. 2006).
161 See CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29, arts. 15, 18–20.
162 Casanova, supra note 14, at 142.  Casanova uses this term to refer to Judaism and
Hinduism, but it applies to Islam as well.
163 Asher Maoz, Proselytism and the Right to Change Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION IN THE
21ST CENTURY 243, 245 (Silvio Ferrari & Rinaldo Cristofori eds., 2010).
164 Ferrari, supra note 133, at 255.
165 See Maoz, supra note 163, at 245.
166 MAYER, supra note 53, at 171.
167 See id.
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be something one chooses for oneself, but a given.  For a person born into
Islam, the only possible choice would be the affirmative one to abandon it, a
choice that would entail abandonment of one’s family and community as
well.168  This reasoning helps explain why Islam holds the Ummah in such
high regard, and why it views conversion from Islam with such alarm.  Apos-
tasy represents not only a personal reversion to unbelief, but a kind of trea-
son, a decision to cut oneself off from, and thus weaken, the Ummah—in
Muslim understanding, the only guarantor of eternal life.169  Moreover, apos-
tasy is naturally seen as reflecting a threat from the outside, an attempt by
enemies to lessen the Ummah’s cohesion and steal souls from their rightful
home.  The convert is a sort of collaborator.
Indeed, classical Islamic law bars apostasy.  Once one becomes a Muslim,
conversion to another religion is legally impossible.170  Apostasy, like treason
in secular legal systems, is a crime punishable by death (or, in some interpre-
tations, imprisonment for women).171  The Ummah must offer the apostate
an opportunity to repent and return to Islam; if he fails to do so, he is exe-
cuted.172  Apostasy works a kind of “civil death” as well.173  The convert is
expunged from the community; his marriage dissolved, his children taken,
and, at least in some interpretations, his entire property forfeited to the
state.174  The apostate may neither inherit nor pass property by bequest to
someone else.175  True, some contemporary Muslim scholars question these
classical rules.  An-Na’im, for example, points out that the Qur’an itself does
not impose a punishment for apostasy, and that “substantial confusion and
fluidity” have always existed in the treatment of apostasy in classical Islamic
law.176  And Mohammad Kamali argues that the hadith imposing the death
penalty for apostasy is limited to a specific, historical context.177  But the
classical view of apostasy and its consequences remains very powerful in
Islamic law today.178
The Cairo Declaration reflects this fact.  Notwithstanding its references
to individual rights, the structure of the Declaration suggests that the relig-
ious community has priority.  For example, unlike either Dignitatis Humanae
168 For a helpful discussion, see Ferrari, supra note 133, at 255.
169 See KALANGES, supra note 56, at 95; see also Casanova, supra note 14, at 142.
170 See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR STATE 119 (2008).
171 See MAYER, supra note 53, at 169.  For the analogy to treason, see AN-NA’IM, supra
note 170, at 118.
172 See MAYER, supra note 53, at 169.
173 Id.; see also Robert W. Hefner, Human Rights and Democracy in Islam: The Indonesian
Case in Global Perspective, in RELIGION AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 11, at 39, 48 (noting accused would lose all civil rights).
174 For a good discussion of the consequences of apostasy in classical Islamic law, see
THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO ISLAMIC LAW 129–30 (Rudolph Peters & Peri
Bearman eds., 2014).
175 See AN-NA’IM, supra note 170, at 119.
176 Id. at 122.
177 See MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’AH LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 173 (2008).
178 See KALANGES, supra note 56, at 95.
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or the Basic Teaching, the Cairo Declaration does not begin by affirming the
dignity of the individual person.  Instead, it begins by affirming the Muslim
community, the Ummah.  The very first clause praises “the civilizing and his-
torical role of the Islamic Ummah which God made the best nation,” the one
“that has given mankind a universal and well-balanced civilization in which
harmony is established between this life and the hereafter and knowledge is
combined with faith.”179  In case anyone should miss the point, the preamble
goes on to affirm “the role that this Ummah should play to guide a humanity
confused by competing trends and ideologies and to provide solutions to the
chronic problems of this materialistic civilization.”180  Article 1, which con-
tains the Declaration’s general teaching on human dignity, likewise speaks
first in terms of community.  Before stating that “[a]ll men are equal in terms
of basic human dignity,” it notes that “[a]ll human beings form one family
whose members are united by submission to God.”181  This seems an unmis-
takable reference to the Ummah.  In Islamic thought, the community that is
“united by submission to God” is the Ummah itself.
Similarly, the Declaration reflects the classical Islamic prohibition on
apostasy.  Article 10 provides, “Islam is the religion of unspoiled nature.  It is
prohibited to exercise any form of compulsion on man or to exploit his pov-
erty or ignorance in order to convert him to another religion or to athe-
ism.”182  Although Article 10 speaks in terms of compulsion and exploitation,
one must remember that it is ultimately “subject to the Islamic Shari’ah,”183
which provides “the only source of reference for the explanation or clarifica-
tion of any of the [Declaration’s] articles.”184  The Sharia prohibits all con-
versions from Islam, not only those from compulsion or exploitation.  As
Mayer writes, given the Declaration’s general outlook, one must “assum[e]
that all conversions from Islam would be deemed to have resulted from ‘com-
pulsion’ or ‘exploitation,’ whereas presumably any technique that was
applied to convert people to Islam would be acceptable.”185
The Cairo Declaration’s recognition of the classical Islamic prohibition
on apostasy implicates two of the most controversial issues in contemporary
human rights law: proselytism and conversion.186  On those issues, individu-
alist accounts of human dignity diverge sharply from their corporate
counterparts.
179 CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29, pmbl.
180 Id.
181 Id. art. 1.
182 Id. art. 10.
183 Id. art. 24.
184 Id. art. 25.
185 MAYER, supra note 53, at 185 (quoting CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29, art. 10).
186 See Maoz, supra note 163, at 243 (“Proselytism and the right to change religion are
among the most controversial issues in the area of religious human rights.”).
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C. Proselytism and the Right to Convert
In the nature of things, an implicit link exists between conversion and
proselytism.  A person is unlikely to change his religion unless he first learns
about a new religion from someone else.  And, in fact, the two rights—the
right to convert and the right to seek converts—have been linked in interna-
tional human rights instruments from the beginning.  As we have seen, Arti-
cle 18 of the Universal Declaration provides that freedom of religion
“includes freedom to change [one’s] religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”187  Today, a
broad consensus exists among lawyers that international human rights law
grants both the right to change one’s religion and the right to persuade
others to change their religion through non-coercive means.188
Nonetheless, both rights have met significant resistance, mostly, but not
exclusively, from Muslim-majority countries.  One can appreciate the resis-
tance by tracing changes in the language of international instruments over
time.  At the vote on the Universal Declaration in 1948, although most Mus-
lim-majority nations endorsed the document, Saudi Arabia abstained,
objecting that the provision on the right to change one’s religion was incon-
sistent with Islam.189  The fact that the Declaration did not create binding
obligations may explain why other Muslim-majority nations went along with
it.190  Two decades later, at the time of the ICCPR—which, unlike the Uni-
versal Declaration, does create binding obligations—opposition from Mus-
lim-majority countries had hardened.191  The ICCPR’s provision on religious
freedom softens the language about the right to change one’s religion.192  It
grants only the right “to have or to adopt a religion or belief of [one’s]
choice.”193
By 1981, when the UN adopted another declaration on religious free-
dom, the language weakened still further, again because of objections from
Muslim-majority countries.194  The Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief con-
tains no language about changing or adopting a religion.  It refers only to the
187 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), supra note 4, art. 18.
188 See Special Rapporteur, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or
Belief, §§ 16, 26, U.N. Doc. A/67/303 (Aug. 13, 2012) (by Heiner Bielefeldt) [hereinafter
Special Rapporteur’s Report].
189 See GLENDON, supra note 4, at 154, 168.
190 Cf. SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 63 (2010) (“The
general consensus about the itemization of rights suggests that little was at stake . . . .”);
Gunn, supra note 6, at 196 & n.7 (absence of formal objections explained by the fact that
the Declaration was understood not to bind states).
191 See KALANGES, supra note 56, at 63.
192 See Christian Walter, The Protection of Freedom of Religion Within the Institutional System
of the United Nations, in UNIVERSAL RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY, supra note 8, at 588,
591.
193 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), supra note 22, art. 18.
194 See Maoz, supra note 163, at 248–49.
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right “to have a religion or whatever belief of [one’s] choice.”195  The most
recent Human Rights Council resolution on religious freedom, adopted in
2014, restores the language about the right to “adopt” a religion, but does so
in a way that implicitly slights the right to convert.196  The resolution pro-
vides for “the freedom to have or not to have, or to adopt, a religion or belief
of one’s choice.”197  As Malcolm Evans observes, “[t]he very structure of the
sentence points to what remains missing—the right to change religion or
belief.”198
Most human rights lawyers maintain that these linguistic changes are not
substantive, and that the right to convert remains.199  The 1981 Declaration,
for example, contains a savings clause that preserves any right contained in
the Universal Declaration—including, presumably, the right to convert—and
a 1993 Human Rights Committee statement maintains that freedom of relig-
ion continues to include “the right to replace one’s current religion or belief
with another.”200  But the changes obviously reflect unease with the idea that
individuals have a right to convert.  And, notwithstanding international com-
mitments, many nations, not only Muslim-majority nations, continue to
restrict conversions and non-coercive efforts to proselytize.201  Often, these
restrictions take the form of laws against so-called fraudulent conversions that
result from missionaries’ taking advantage of listeners’ poverty or naivete´.202
In practice, however, these laws restrict non-exploitative proselytism as
well.203  Indeed, the U.N.’s Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Religion or
Belief wrote recently that such restrictions have become “a human rights
problem of great concern . . . in various parts of the world.”204
The controversy surrounding proselytism and conversion reflects the
conflict between individualist and corporate perspectives on human dig-
nity.205  From individualist perspectives, both the right to convert and the
right to seek converts are obvious.  Consider first the secularist understand-
195 G.A. Res. 36/55, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, art. 1 (Nov. 25, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 U.N.
Declaration].
196 Human Rights Council Res. 25/12, § 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/25/12 (Jan. 3,
2014).
197 Id.
198 Malcolm D Evans, Challenging Conventional Assumptions: The Case for a Preventive
Approach to the Protection of the Freedom of Religion or Belief, in CHANGING NATURE OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS, supra note 12, at 25, 30.
199 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 188, §§ 17–18.
200 Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 22, Freedom of Thought, Conscience or
Religion, art. 18, § 5 (1993), in COMPILATION OF GENERAL COMMENTS AND GENERAL RECOM-
MENDATIONS ADOPTED BY HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES, U.N. Doc. HRI/Gen/Rev.9 (May
27, 2008); see also 1981 U.N. Declaration, supra note 195, art. 8.
201 See Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 188, §§ 36–39, 44–46; see also Hertzke,
supra note 8, at 124.
202 See Special Rapporteur’s Report, supra note 188, § 44.
203 See id. § 45.
204 Id. § 15.
205 See Casanova, supra note 14, at 141–42.
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ing, in which human dignity inheres in the subjective choice of the individual
person.  This understanding implies that the individual always has “the free-
dom to change a belief or to retain one, as well as to invite others to recon-
sider their faith.”206  Heiner Bielefeldt describes the position well: Religious
freedom “implies having options to freely develop, change, or defend
one’s . . . identity and to reach out to others.”207  One’s religious identity “is
always an identity in the making, in the sense that it can change in many
different ways and can legitimately be exposed to non-coercive missionary
activities, including non-violent forms of provocation.”208  As long as prosely-
tism does not involve coercion or exploitation—both of which would render
the choice to convert illegitimate—the secularist position would allow it.
The Catholic understanding is the same.  As we have seen, Dignitatis
Humanae teaches that the individual human person has the right to inquire
into religious truth and conform himself to it as best he can.209  In the nature
of things, the inquiry cannot be a solitary one.  The individual must be able
to communicate with others in an unimpeded way.  The inquiry into relig-
ious truth must be “free” and “carried on with the aid of teaching or instruc-
tion, communication and dialogue, in the course of which men explain to
one another the truth they have discovered, or think they have discovered, in
order thus to assist one another in the quest for truth.”210
Note the phrase, “think they have discovered.”  Under Dignitatis
Humanae, the right to proclaim one’s religious beliefs, and to try to convince
others, does not depend on the correctness of the message.  Even erroneous
religions have the right to seek converts.  True, Dignitatis Humanae condemns
coercive and exploitative proselytism.  “[I]n spreading religious faith and in
introducing religious practices,” it teaches, “everyone ought at all times to
refrain from any manner of action which might seem to carry a hint of coer-
cion or of a kind of persuasion that would be dishonorable or unworthy,
especially when dealing with poor or uneducated people.”211  In principle,
however, in contemporary Catholic understanding, all individual persons
and religious communities have the right publicly to seek converts.  A state
may not restrict them in order to protect traditional or culturally significant
religions.
Since Vatican II, the Catholic Church has honored this teaching in prac-
tice.  Catholic bishops occasionally complain about “sheep-stealing,” particu-
larly in Latin America, where Pentecostal and Evangelical churches have had
notable success in gaining converts from Catholicism.212  But they have not
called for legal restrictions.  As Silvio Ferrari explains, although Catholic rep-
206 Heiner Bielefeldt, Misperceptions of Freedom of Religion or Belief, 35 HUM. RTS. Q. 33, 44
(2013).
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 See Dignitatis Humanae, supra note 31, para. 3.
210 Id.
211 Id. para. 4.
212 See Ferrari, supra note 133, at 261.
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resentatives frequently stress that Pentecostals and Evangelicals should
respect Latin America’s Catholic heritage, they have never argued that prose-
lytism by these groups should be unlawful.213  This is so, he maintains,
because the Catholic Church in Latin America has internalized the teachings
on religious freedom contained in Vatican II documents like Dignitatis
Humanae.214
In short, both the secularist and the contemporary Catholic positions
endorse the rights to convert and to seek converts, limited only by a concern
with preventing coercive or exploitative conduct.  In this, both positions dif-
fer greatly from corporate approaches like those of the Organization of
Islamic Cooperation and the Russian Orthodox Church.  From these per-
spectives, proselytism and conversions pose illegitimate threats to the target
community.215  Because religion and culture are often deeply intertwined,
proselytism is perceived as an effort to erase traditional communal identities
and replace them with new, foreign ones.  As An-Na’im writes, proselytism is
not seen as letting the “free market of religious ideas” prevail.216  It is about
unfair domination on the part of proselytizers, who inevitably come from
outside.
Consider first the position of the OIC.  I have already explained the
Cairo Declaration’s implicit endorsement of the classical rule prohibiting
apostasy from Islam.  The Declaration also reflects the traditional rule against
attempts to proselytize among Muslims, even in non-coercive ways.  Under
Article 22, individuals have a right to express their opinions freely and “advo-
cate what is right”—but only in a manner consistent with the Sharia.217  Of
course, proselytism inevitably involves criticism, if only implicit, of the Sharia,
and classical Islamic law would certainly not view the propagation of a rival
faith as “advocating what is right.”  As a result, one must understand the
Cairo Declaration to restrict attempts by non-Muslims to convince Muslims to
join their faith.
Indeed, as I have explained, resistance from Muslim-majority countries
has led to the weakening of international human rights instruments on the
right to convert.  And a number of Muslim-majority states (though not all)
continue to restrict conversions from Islam and proselytism among Mus-
lims.218  A few examples will suffice.  Morocco and Algeria criminalize any
attempt to “shake the faith of a Muslim.”219  Pakistan formally allows both
proselytism and conversion, but prohibits blasphemy and other speech that
insults Islam.  In practice, the blasphemy laws operate as a limitation on both
213 See id. at 262.
214 See id.
215 See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA’IM, MUSLIMS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 203–07 (2010).
216 Id. at 205 (quotation omitted).
217 CAIRO DECLARATION, supra note 29, art. 22.
218 See Roberta Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, Proselytism and the Right to Change Religion in Islam, in
LAW AND RELIGION IN THE 21st CENTURY, supra note 163, at 253, 253.
219 Id. at 255 (Morocco); id. at 256 (Algeria).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL409.txt unknown Seq: 30 11-MAY-16 8:22
1546 notre dame law review [vol. 91:4
conversions and the propagation of non-Muslim faiths.220  In Malaysia, the
constitution allows the state to criminalize “the propagation of any religious
doctrine or belief among persons professing the religion of Islam.”221  In all
these cases, the principal concern is the collective.  Proselytism is restricted
“because it is perceived as a major threat to the coherence and cohesion” of
the Ummah.222
Although the Russian Orthodox Church’s position differs significantly
from the OIC’s—it does not endorse legal bans on conversion, even implic-
itly—it too reflects a corporate understanding that restricts proselytism.223
The Basic Teaching, recall, emphasizes the dignity of religious communities,
particularly those that embody national and cultural traditions, and holds
that preservation of those traditions is itself a human right.  It follows that the
state has a legitimate interest in protecting traditional religious communities
from outside threats, including from rival religions.  Indeed, the Russian
Orthodox Church consistently has invoked a corporate understanding of
religious freedom to support restrictions on the activities of non-Orthodox
religions in Russia.
For example, although the Church’s 2000 statement, Basic Principles of
Attitude to the Non-Orthodox, endorses cooperation with “traditional confes-
sions” on social issues, it calls for restrictions on the missionary activities of
non-Orthodox groups within the Russian Orthodox Church’s “canonical ter-
ritory,” including Russia and the Baltic States.224  Traditional religious com-
munities, the statement concedes, have a right “to witness to their faith and
conduct religious education among the population groups that traditionally
belong to them.”225  But they may not proselytize among Orthodox Chris-
tians and attempt to “steal[ ]” Orthodox faithful.226  The statement contem-
plates even greater restrictions on non-traditional religions—non-Trinitarian
Christians, for example. It opposes “any destructive missionary activity” at all
on the part of these “sects.”227
Subsequent statements by Russian Orthodox Church leaders elaborate
on the idea of a “cultural canonical territory,” within which a church may
properly limit proselytism by foreign religious organizations.228  Because of
cultural and historical ties, the argument goes, a particular religion may have
220 Id. at 257–58.
221 Ferrari, supra note 133, at 264 (quoting MALAY. CONST. art. 11, § 4).
222 Beck-Peccoz, supra note 218, at 259.
223 Cf. Petkoff, supra note 12, at 218–19 (noting cooperation between Russian Ortho-
dox Church and Muslim organizations on the question of proselytism).
224 Basic Principles of Attitude to the Non-Orthodox, THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH § 6.1,
https://mospat.ru/en/documents/attitude-to-the-non-orthodox/vi/ (last visited Feb. 21,
2016).
225 Id. § 6.3.
226 Id. § 6.2.
227 Id. § 6.3.
228 See Ferrari, supra note 133, at 260 (quoting Hilarion Alfeyev, The Practical Application
of the Principle of Canonical Territory, 87 EUROPAICA BULLETIN (Feb. 17, 2006), http://
orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/87.aspx).
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a natural home in a particular country, and a legitimate claim to protection
from outsiders.  In Russia, for example, “the entire population” has “cultural
roots” that attach it to Orthodoxy.229  Even non-religious Russians are, in a
way, latent Orthodox.  Religious freedom for the Orthodox Church thus
requires non-Orthodox groups to limit their activities to their own members
and allow the Orthodox to tend to everyone else.230  This communal view of
religious freedom obviously conflicts with the individualism of both the Cath-
olic and secularist understandings.  Indeed, when the Catholic Church re-
established its own hierarchy in Russia in 2002, it occasioned a sharp debate
in which the Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches each accused the
other of violating human rights.231
The second example is the Russian anti-proselytism law of 1997.  For-
mally known as the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associa-
tions, the law imposes a number of restrictions on the activities of non-
Orthodox groups in Russia.232  For example, no religious group may operate
legally unless it has been registered with the government for fifteen years.233
Moreover, the act’s preamble divides religious groups into three categories,
implicitly in order of merit.  Orthodoxy comes first, as having made a “special
contribution” to Russian history, spirituality, and culture.234  Next come non-
Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other religions that
have “inseparable” historical associations with “Russia’s peoples.”235  Finally,
at the bottom, are new religions that lack any traditional place in Russia.236
The Russian Orthodox Church strongly supported (and supports) the
1997 law, and it is easy to see why.237  The law reflects the Church’s under-
standing of religious freedom, which emphasizes the dignity and rights of
traditional religious communities—principally, of course, the Russian Ortho-
dox Church itself.238  The law comports with the corporate vision of religious
freedom the Russian Orthodox Church has consistently expressed in docu-
ments like the Basic Teaching and the Basic Principles.  Of course, it entirely
fails to comport with individualist understandings of religious freedom, and
it has occasioned great criticism from human rights advocates in the West.239
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom regularly cites the
law in its annual reports on violations of religious freedom.240
229 Id.
230 See id.
231 See id. at 260–61.
232 See STOECKL, supra note 48, at 29.
233 See id.
234 Id. at 30.
235 Id.
236 See id.
237 On the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate in the law’s passage, see id. at 29.
238 As Katherine Stoeckl observes, the Church led the process of defining which groups
would be included in the list of traditionally important religions. Id. at 31.
239 See, e.g., FARR, supra note 16, at 23.
240 See STOECKL, supra note 48, at 30.
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III. CONCLUSION: TOWARD A MORE MODEST APPROACH
Fifty years after Dignitatis Humanae, no universal definition of human
dignity exists.  A variety of inconsistent understandings compete with one
another, preventing agreement on crucial legal issues.  With respect to same-
sex marriage and other “new rights,” objective understandings of dignity,
such as those promoted by the Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches and
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, conflict with the secularist, subjec-
tive understanding that most Western states and NGOs endorse.  On other
issues, like proselytism and the right to convert, the alliances shift.  With
respect to those issues, the individualism of the Catholic Church, secularist
human rights advocates, and many Western states conflicts with the corpo-
rate understanding of dignity endorsed by the Russian Orthodox Church,
the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and many non-Western states.
When it comes to human dignity, a stalemate exists.
How should we lawyers respond?  I can only offer some brief observa-
tions here.  One response would be to work harder to achieve a universal
consensus on dignity and rights.  Some scholars, particularly those from a
Western perspective, favor this approach.  Invariably, it involves convincing
others to accept the scholars’ own definitions of dignity: the universal stan-
dard, it turns out, is one’s own.  For example, Thomas Farr argues the United
States should do more to promote the objective, individualist, natural-law
understanding of dignity reflected in documents like Dignitatis Humanae.241
Farr criticizes American administrations for failing to persuade other interna-
tional actors of the wisdom of this understanding.  For example, he says, the
United States should make it “a strategic priority” to convince the Russian
Orthodox Church to abandon its “shortsighted” opposition to proselytism.242
For Farr, the Church’s focus on communal religious identity is a pretext for
maintaining an illegitimate “religious monopoly” over believers’ con-
sciences—a monopoly which, in the long run, will only serve to injure Rus-
sian Orthodoxy.243
Most Western-oriented legal scholars would not share Farr’s commit-
ment to natural law.  But even scholars with a subjective understanding often
share his conviction that others across the globe must give up their mistaken
ideas about dignity in order to join an international consensus.  Recall those
who argue that human dignity requires that same-sex marriage be an interna-
tional human right.  Or those who insist that human dignity requires that
international law include the rights to proselytize and convert.  Like Farr,
these scholars and lawyers also maintain that international institutions must
adopt a universal understanding of dignity—their own.
241 See FARR, supra note 16, at 20–25; cf. Philpott, supra note 16, at 176 (agreeing with
Farr that the United States should “promote[ ] democratic regimes characterized by relig-
ious freedom and the participation of religious actors”).
242 Thomas Farr, International Religious Freedom and Moral Responsibility, in CHALLENGES
TO RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 14, at 193, 199.
243 Id.
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Perhaps these strategies will be successful with time.  Perhaps, with com-
mitment, Western human rights advocates will convince the rest of the world
that individualist conceptions of dignity and religious freedom are norma-
tively superior to others.  Individualism has transformed religious communi-
ties in the past.244  Maybe those communities that worry today about the
corroding effects of individualism on tradition will also be convinced, in
time, that they have nothing to fear, and much to gain, from adopting the
Western approach.245  Some evidence does exist for an emerging consensus
on dignity.  Andrea Pin, for example, argues that developments since the
Arab Spring suggest the influence of international human rights standards
on the Arab concept of karama, or dignity.246
To my mind, though, universalizing approaches seem doomed to fail-
ure.  The different understandings of dignity and rights are simply too
profound.  Consider arguments within the West itself.  It is very unlikely that
actors with an objective understanding of dignity, such as the Catholic
Church, will be persuaded to accept a subjective understanding that would
reverse centuries of reflection and practice.  Even Pope Francis, who more
than other recent popes has suggested change within the Church, has
endorsed the approach of Dignitatis Humanae.247  Similarly, it is unlikely that
advocates of subjective understandings will accept an objective approach that
would negate policy goals, such as same-sex marriage, that they view as vital to
human flourishing.  Indeed, my impression, based on experience in the
American legal academy, is that these two sides have increasingly little to say
to one another.248
And that’s just within the West.  Disagreements that reflect what Samuel
Huntington famously referred to as civilizational divides will be even more
difficult to bridge.249  Such disagreements often implicate profound con-
cerns about cultures’ histories, values, and identities.  It is not a matter of
failing to understand Western concepts of dignity and freedom; it is a matter
of considering and rejecting them.  Recall, for example, the Orthodox resis-
tance to “Western” individualism that underlies much of the Basic Teaching,
or the devotion to the Ummah that runs through the Cairo Declaration.250  If
the fights about traditional values resolutions at the Human Rights Council
reveal anything, it is the deep resentment many non-Western countries and
organizations feel for attempts by foreigners to change domestic cultures and
244 See Casanova, supra note 14, at 151.
245 Cf. Farr, supra note 242, at 197 (discussing sociological research suggesting the ben-
efits to religious communities of religious competition).
246 See Pin, supra note 17, at 73–80.
247 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
248 Cf. Marc O. DeGirolami, The Ideological Fragmentation of Public Law, CTR. FOR L. &
RELIGION F. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://clrforum.org/2015/01/12/the-ideological-fragmenta
tion-of-public-law/.
249 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 28 (1996).
250 See supra notes 150–55 and accompanying text (discussing Basic Teaching); supra
notes 179–81 (discussing Cairo Declaration).
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values.251  As I once heard a leading law-and-religion scholar remark, if you
give people a choice between “human rights” and their religion, most people
will choose their religion every time.  It is no more likely that the Russian
Orthodox Church will adopt a “Western” understanding of proselytism than
Western human rights advocates will adopt the Russian Orthodox Church’s
view—a result, incidentally, which no one in the West seems ever to
contemplate.
To my mind, the better part of wisdom lies in accepting the global disa-
greement on dignity and finding humane ways to accommodate it.  Mary
Ann Glendon has suggested one plausible solution: reliance on the margin
of appreciation.252  This concept, borrowed from the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights, allows nations some discretion to adapt
international human rights guarantees, including religious liberty, to local
cultural and social realities.253  The concept is not a panacea.  As Glendon
concedes, “[t]he devil . . . is in the details.”254  It will be hard to achieve
agreement on precisely how much discretion nations should have: “Where
does legitimate pluralism end and pure cultural relativism begin?”255  Moreo-
ver, the margin of appreciation would do nothing to resolve debates about
dignity and religious liberty within a culture.  Nonetheless, adopting the con-
cept with respect to international guarantees of religious liberty could help
resolve some of the tensions I have identified.
Alternatively, we might adopt a more modest conception of human
rights, including the right to religious liberty—a minimalist approach that
would seek agreement on basic things like ending violent persecution and
providing a modicum of security for besieged religious minorities.  Such an
approach would no doubt seem defeatist to universalizers.  Indeed, Farr has
criticized the American State Department for limiting itself only to “denounc-
ing persecution and saving victims” rather than “promoting freedom in any
long-term political sense.”256  But a more modest approach, one that
attempts to prevent or at least limit the severity of humanitarian “catastro-
phe[s],” could do real good.257  At this writing, millions of religious refugees
are fleeing for their lives from Iraq and Syria, and the international commu-
nity seems incapable of coordinating a response.  An effective, minimalist
251 On the traditional values resolutions, see supra Section I.C.
252 See Mary Ann Glendon, Religious Freedom in the 21st Century: Old Biases, Fresh Chal-
lenges, New Frontiers, in UNIVERSAL RIGHTS IN A WORLD OF DIVERSITY, supra note 8, at 651,
659.
253 See id.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 659–60.
256 FARR, supra note 16, at 13.
257 MOYN, supra note 190, at 226 (discussing Professor Henry Steiner’s distinction
between “human rights as catastrophe prevention and human rights as utopian politics”);
cf. POSNER, supra note 10, at 7 (arguing that human rights law should follow developmental
economics and “abandon . . . utopian aspirations” in favor of “small-scale interventions”
that “can do good by relieving the worst forms of misery and poverty in the short term”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-4\NDL409.txt unknown Seq: 35 11-MAY-16 8:22
2016] of  human  dignities 1551
approach would offer these suffering people much more help than attempts
to forge a deep consensus on the contours of human dignity.
Developing these ideas must await another day.  For now, I have shown
that we lawyers should forgo the search for universal definitions of human
dignity and religious freedom.  In a world of competing cultures and values,
such a search can only end in frustration.  Either of the two more modest
approaches I outline here would be much more likely to succeed in the real
world—a world of human dignities—than the more ambitious programs cur-
rently on offer.
